On December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union was offi cially dissolved. A day earlier, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had offi cially resigned, claiming that his offi ce no longer existed, and passed on the mantle of power to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
While the suddenness of the dissolution of the Soviet Union took many Western policy makers by surprise, they were quick to tout the triumph of Western ideology over communism. The Western political ethos had overtaken the Soviet dogma, and was moving eastward. Western infl uence was reaching its zenith as more and more of the Eastern European countries that had been Soviet satellite states turned their backs on the Soviet Union and turned towards liberal democracy.
Like the transitions in Eastern Europe that had occurred just a couple of years earlier, Russian President Yeltsin embraced Western values and demanded a quick transition to a market economy. While he was quick to accept Western economic institutions, he was less enthusiastic about adopting Western democratic norms. However, it is nevertheless clear that the dissolution of the Soviet Union further proved that Western soft power was at its zenith, while Russian soft power was at a nadir. The Soviet system had collapsed, and the ideology of the Soviet period had been shown to be less attractive than Western ideology. While Russians began to embrace capitalism and Western ideologies, Russian soft power remained very weak. Despite the fact that the roots of Russian soft power were strong, Moscow's perceived weakness and fi nancial problems could not present an attractive face internationally.
In fact, the early period of Yeltsin's presidency was focused on embracing American soft power and seeking aid from the West. Yeltsin tried to integrate Russia into Western institutions and tried to institute economic reforms to bring Russia more in line with Western ideology. The economic reforms actually led to increased corruption and economic inequality by allowing oligarchs to gain control of former state-owned enterprises.
1 This in turn soured the Russian public on Western ideology, and clearly showed that Russia needed to forge its own path to democratization and economic reform.
Following several years of economic recession, Russia's economy began to improve. Russia's improved economy meant that it had one of the best economies in the post-Soviet region. Many people from poorer regional states began immigrating to Russia to better their lives. This new immigration and the booming state of the Russian economy began to increase Russian soft power in the region.
2 However, the increase in Russian soft power was only partially due to the economy and energy. Another major factor was Russian President Putin's foreign policy reorientation that prioritized relations with the former Soviet states. He focused on building relationships with these countries, and while Russia was the regional hegemon, it did not have the power to force other regional states to comply with its wishes. Instead, Moscow had to build relationships and work to develop regional trust.
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The lack of a coercive foreign policy during the early 2000's helped to further aide in the spread of Russia's soft power. 4 This is not to say that Russia was unwilling to use coercive force to infl uence foreign policy and domestic policy outcomes, merely that during this period Russia was forced to fi rst build enough trust to achieve its foreign policy goals, and thus used less coercive force. In fact during this period, some scholars heralded the arrival of Russian soft power and the ability of the Russian government to spread that soft power within the post-Soviet region.
5 Russian soft power was still not strong during this period, but scholars noted that it had increased signifi cantly since its nadir at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The purpose of this article is to examine Russian soft power and its presence in the former Soviet states and Eastern Europe. We fi rst examine the roots of Russian soft power, then we examine the positive aspects of Russian soft power, then we turn to the competition over the spread of soft power, and fi nally we examine Russia's policy towards soft power and its efforts to strengthen its soft power.
COMPARATIVE POLITICS, RUSSIA . Writers like Blok perpetuated the idea of Russian exceptionalism. They believed that the Russian identity truly was unique and unrepeatable and not like any other character in the East or the West. The Russian identity was based on straddling both Asia and Europe and was distinct in that it embraced the suffering that took place because of its geographical vulnerability. Blok sees the Russian identity as not only exceptional and bridging different cultures, but suffering of the people is part of the national identity. For example, he describes the people as suffering tremendously to protect Europe from the attack of the Mongols.
The Russian philosophy of suffering is not unique to Blok but originates in the Russian Orthodox faith which recognized Jesus Christ's agony which absolved the sins of man. Further, the Virgin Mary suffered tremendously in losing her only son so that man's iniquities could be forgiven. The suffering of both Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary make them closer to God and serve as role models for Orthodox Christians. The Russian Orthodox Church therefore teaches that suffering is an important aspect of faith, and that through suffering, true believers will be closer to God and will be rewarded for their suffering in the afterlife.
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Many writers expanded on the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church on the virtues of suffering. For example, Fyodor Dostoevsky not only utilized Russian Orthodox core beliefs in many of his books, but also infused those beliefs with Russian nationalism. He often wrote of a Slavic nationalism that formed the basis of a Russian nationality. Thus many of his characters not only followed Orthodox teachings, but also took on a uniquely Russian 14 The Russian Soul was changed but not lost through the original encounter with modernity, so the contemporary Western intellectual climate is just as potentially damaging to the Russian ethos. To illustrate how deeply this idea is embedded in the Russian ethos, the Soviet Union was offi cially atheistic but within its ideology it maintained the idea that the Russian people were suffering for all of humanity.
15 Christian suffering is so ingrained on the Russian soul that it was present even during the communist period.
The Russian Soul combines elements of Russian philosophy with religious suffering and nationalism to create the basis of a national identity. Further, the concept of the Russian Soul is one of the roots of Russian soft power. However, while the Russian Soul is an important foundation for Russian soft power, it is not its only basis. Russian soft power builds upon and borrows from the Russian Soul.
The Russian national identity is made up not only of their cultural ethos, but also of their geopolitical heritage. An important factor is Russia's status in the global hierarchy as a great power. The collapse of the Soviet Union dealt a huge blow to the Russian sense of self-respect. Russia believed that even though it was no longer 11 Ilyin's philosophy is important as a counter to Western philosophy because he stresses the strength of the state as being the most important factor of survival and that democracy is problematic as it can weaken the state. Furthermore, a strong leader must be able to strengthen the state and take care of its citizen's interests. Finally, it is important to note that selfrespect is theoretically important because its weakening is linked to a higher likelihood of a revolution. As Moscow's place as a great power fell following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many policy makers pointed to its loss of face and respect, which in turn led to more turmoil in Russia. As the state strengthened during the early 2000's due to rising oil prices and Putin's policies, policy makers began to solidify their understanding of Russian national identity and its place in the international system. Using the concept of national identity as a building block, Russian soft power combines different cultural aspects to fully create an indigenous, home-produced soft power. We now turn to the various cultural aspects that are also included in contemporary Russian soft power.
Russian Language
As of 2010, the Russian language was spoken by approximately 137.5 million native speakers in Russia, 93.7 million native speakers in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and 12.9 million native speakers in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 19 The fact that so many people share Russian as their native language across Eastern Europe and the FSU facilitates the spread of Russian soft power. The shared language allows for the dissemination of information through various types of media and social media, allowing the Russian government to spread its soft power.
In the early 1990's, debates within the Russian government raged as to how closely to associate with those native Russian speakers who following the collapse of the Soviet Union found themselves living in newly independent countries. 20 Many policy makers wanted to forge closer ties and protect ethnic Russian speaking minorities in countries like the Baltic States. They tried to get many governments, especially in the Baltics, to adopt Russian as a national language or minimally to adopt policies protecting native Russian speakers.
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Despite the fact that the policy makers were often unsuccessful at helping to protect ethnic Russian minority linguistic rights, nevertheless native Russian language speakers were spread in large numbers across the FSU and Eastern Europe allowing a receptive audience for the spread of Russian soft power. While we will discuss the Russian government's use of media to spread its soft power later in this article, it is important to note that the number of native Russian speakers allows the government to spread its message very easily. We now turn to a discussion of historical nostalgia.
Historical Nostalgia
While Moscow's communist government collapsed for a myriad of reasons, its breakdown had a profound effect on people living within the Soviet Union. For many individuals with little access to wealth and ties to the government, the social net that they could rely on during Soviet times was no longer available. They had worked all of their lives taking for granted that the guarantees provided by the Soviet government would always be available. However, with the collapse, those guarantees were no longer present. People found their savings depleted through hyperinfl ation and no longer having guaranteed employment, they were left with no understanding as to how to function within a new society based on capitalist rules. In fact, Russian President Vladimir Putin famously stated: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself ˮ.
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The social sphere was one of the most important aspects of life in the former Soviet Union to suffer. Not only was the social safety net gone, but people also had to change their orientation from a communal social structure to a new one which was based upon rewarding individualism. In this respect, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster for the Russian people.
While the Soviet Union had many problems, nevertheless, many who found it diffi cult to drastically change their weltanschauung 23 began to feel a certain nostalgia for the Soviet way of life. This was not only true for those living in the former Soviet Union, but was also true for those who were living in Eastern Europe and the former Warsaw Pact countries. Many of those people enjoyed watching Soviet movies, cartoons, and listening to Soviet and socialist music.
This nostalgia further laid the foundation for Russian soft power to spread not only throughout the former Soviet Union, but also into Eastern Europe. While people would often discuss the problems and diffi culties of the 22 Soviet period, over time, people began looking fondly back not to its political aspects, but rather to its culture. However, the longing for old Soviet movies and music was not the only cultural export that helped bolster Russian soft power. We now turn to other cultural exports which help to build Russian soft power.
Russian Exports of High Culture
The fi ne arts have always been considered a good way to spread cultural goodwill and soft power. In the United States, efforts had often been made for groups to travel to showcase their talents and spread American soft power as cultural ambassadors. American dance companies were often sponsored by the United States Department of State to travel to showcase American culture and values. 24 This was a relatively inexpensive way of garnering good publicity and spreading soft power.
Groups like Russia's Mariinsky Ballet Company not only have profi ted from signing cooperation agreements with Western Theaters but have also helped to spread Russian soft power. People who only know of the reputation of Russian ballet and opera are able to gain exposure to the high quality of Russian dance and opera.
Companies aren't the only groups that have acted as cultural diplomats of Russian culture. Certain individual artists have also gained worldwide notoriety and spread Russian soft power. For example, singers Dmitry Khvorostovsky and Anna Netrebko are famous around the world, and they are in high demand by global Opera companies.
In addition to fi ne arts, Russia is internationally known for its literature and classical music. Authors such as Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Tolstoy and others are often read in translation around the world, while orchestras around the world often play Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Glinka, among other famous Russian composers. In short, Russia's soft power derives its strength from a long history of renowned high culture. Its soft power capabilities are extremely high provided that COMPARATIVE POLITICS, RUSSIA . 2017 Vol.8 No.2
Russia is able to harness and utilize its cultural manifestations. We now turn to the use of soft power and how governments can spread soft power.
Spreading Soft Power
One of the diffi culties of soft power is harnessing it for use. One of the main ways that the United States spreads soft power is by providing information. During the Cold War, the United States used media programming like Voice of America and other programs that would spread the offi cial United States message and hope that it would resonate and, thereby, gain greater infl uence. This programming was broadcast over short wave radio to avoid government censors. Many people in countries that strictly controlled information would often try to listen to broadcasts from the United States, equating Voice of America with the freedom that many people sought. In fact, the United States' soft power spread so effectively precisely because it stood for freedom and in stark contrast to authoritarian regimes during the Soviet era.
While soft power can be spread through government initiatives, the most effective method of spreading soft power is through non-government entities such as cultural exports. However, soft power is not only spread through the export of information and culture. A country's ideology and philosophical orientation is extremely vital to spreading soft power. We now turn to examining how Russia spreads its soft power.
Spreading Russian Soft Power
In the early 2000's, Moscow saw its soft power increase along with its national identity and Russia became one of the most stable countries in the post-Soviet space, and many workers began to immigrate. Russia began a more conciliatory foreign policy towards regional states within the post-Soviet region, and cooperated with the United States on many issues such as counter-terrorism operations and intelligence.
While the early 2000's were marked with more conciliatory foreign policy towards many states within the post-Soviet region, Russia was not able to build trust with all of its regional neighbors. States like Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan developed cooperative relations with Russia, while states like Moldova and Georgia worked to distance themselves.
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During this period Russia was trying to develop a new regional identity to cement its place as the regional hegemon by forming new multilateral organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Customs Union, and the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 26 Further, the development of these organizations was a way in trying to regain the seat at the table of global leadership that Russia had lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that during the early 2000's, Moscow was content to be a regional power. It did not try to spread its soft power globally, as it recognized that it did not have the ability to do so. However, not all of the states within the region were happy with Russian plans for regional order.
Georgia and Moldova opposed the Russian regional order and sought to counter Russian regional hegemonic power. Thus, they began to pursue a more open relationship with the European Union. In turn, the EU was interested in gaining infl uence in the former Soviet states, and wanted to try and use the European Neighborhood Program (ENP) which gave preferential access to European markets while also creating a new category of states.
27 These states would be able to cooperate with the EU, but would be unlikely to become 25 Slobodchikoff, Michael O. Strategic Cooperation: Overcoming the Barriers of Global Anarchy. Lexington Books, 2013. 26 For a more complete list of multilateral organizations in the post-Soviet space, see (Slobodchikoff 2014 36 Russia had been working towards economic integration with Ukraine and had provided special pricing for natural gas in exchange for continued infl uence. Yet, despite the fact that it was in Ukraine's economic interest to maintain good relations with Russia, the Orange Revolution proved that Ukraine was striving to distance itself from Russian infl uence and move toward the West and potential EU membership.
Russia understood the results of the Orange Revolution as being evidence of the power of ideas. 37 The EU had long prided itself on being an ideational power capable of fundamentally changing the behavior and domestic institutions of the state, 38 and Russia believed that the Orange Revolution showed that the EU was now trying to vie for infl uence in the former Soviet states, an area that Russia had traditionally viewed as being within its own sphere of infl uence. Russia believed that if it was going to maintain its regional infl uence, it needed to compete with the European Union in its power of ideas. It realized that it needed to develop its own powerful ideas that would be able to successfully counter those offered by the EU. In short, it needed to bolster its soft power and then utilize it to maintain and even gain infl uence against the EU. However, more fundamentally Russia also understood that it could not directly counter the ideas of the West. The Russian national identity was a powerful symbol domestically, but was not powerful outside of Russia. Therefore, it had to develop a new strategy to counter Western infl uence. Russia had to turn to a negative campaign against Western values while it did not need to provide an alternative value system. All Russia had to do was to try to discredit and raise questions about Western values, and they could be successful in slowing the spread of Western soft power. This made its task easier as Moscow did not need to provide an alternative, but sought to show the hypocrisy or moral incongruity in the Western proposals.
However, before they could successfully discredit Western values, they had to target the damage caused by Western values present in the post-Soviet space. They believed that despite the fact that the EU and NATO were looking to spread into Eastern Europe and the Baltics, that neither NATO nor the EU member states would risk direct war with Russia. Thus, they cultivated frozen confl icts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. Russia recognized that according to ascension rules for both organizations, territorial confl icts and simmering civil war would prevent those states from becoming members. Both the EU and NATO tried to maintain close ties with the elites of those states with frozen confl icts, often by stating that eventually those states might be able to gain membership.
In the case of Georgia, it was led to believe that it could eventually join the EU and NATO, and strongly believed that this would be a good way to counter Russia's regional hegemonic power. However, in 2008, Georgia attacked the breakaway republic of South Ossetia, which ignited a small war between Russia and Georgia. Russia invaded Georgian territory and defeated the Georgian army.
The 2008 Georgian War was the last bit of evidence to show a break between Russia and the West. Russia was willing to prevent Western infl uence from expanding into the former Soviet states by using force if necessary. Further, Russian actions showed that they believed that the world system was no longer unipolar, but rather was starting to become more multipolar, and in turn led Russian policy makers to see Russia as a post-Western power.
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In other words, Russia believed that the time of US hegemony was quickly coming to an end, and that it could provide an alternative regional order than that provided by the West.
It is important to note that after the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Russian soft power evolved differently from traditional soft power proposed by Nye in that it really lacks a specifi c ideology. Instead, Russian soft power focuses on being a counter ideology, specifi cally setting itself up as being a power that is counter to that of the West. 40 It views the expansion of Western power as a threat, and views its soft power as being a vital element of countering that threat.
While Russian hard power was on display in the Georgian War, Russian soft power was extremely important in increasing Russia's power in the region. For example, Russian soft power was largely responsible for rolling back many of the gains of the color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. 41 While many in the West had looked upon the color revolutions as a stark democratic transition in both Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, corruption and many other problems hampered the new governments that had been established, and soon elites again turned toward accepting Russian infl uence in the region.
It is important to note that Russian soft power, and specifi cally the use of Russian soft power by the government was not only 39 used as a tool to expand Russian infl uence. While some scholars argue that Russian soft power is merely a means of creating a new Russian empire, 42 it was really not a tool to try to recreate a new Russian empire. In fact, the most important use of Russian soft power was mainly to try to create regional stability and to keep outside infl uence from entering into the post-Soviet space. 43 That is not to say that Russia was not looking to increase its infl uence, merely that was not its overarching goal. However, as both the EU and NATO expanded and Russia grew even more powerful, Russia began to formulate its soft power to move beyond the regional level to try to spread its version of soft power globally. 44 Specifi cally, it looked to counter Western values and ideology on a global scale. We now turn to examining how the Russian government has tried to spread its soft power globally.
COMPARATIVE POLITICS, RUSSIA . 2017 Vol.8 No.2 Russia realized that it could not directly challenge the power of the United States and the West. It was a resurgent regional power, but certainly did not possess enough power to directly contest Washington. One of the best ways to oppose the United States was to indirectly do so, by disputing some normative aspects of Western ideology. For example, Russia developed a new form of democracy that it refers to as "Sovereign Democracy," which provides a direct contrast to the norm of liberal democracy that is spread by the West. 45 By using such normative forms of challenging Western norms, Russia worked with China to balance Western soft power in Eastern Europe. 46 Russian leaders wanted to create the governmental structures that would allow it to present its message to foreign audiences and expand its soft power. Several initiatives emerged in the past decade and they have given Moscow the ability to communicate globally. One institutional effort to defend Russia's image in the West was the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation that was opened in Moscow in 2007 and has since expanded to Paris and New York. 47 This enterprise defends the Russian democratic ethos and highlights the instances when the West violates democratic principles or human rights. 48 The government has also hired American public relations companies to allow it better communicate Russian ideas to Western audiences. 49 The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation emerged in 2010 and it works to defend Russian governmental institutions and cultural values and it works to coordinate other NGOs operating internationally. 50 The Russian Council on International Affairs also opened in 2010 and it is focused on spreading public diplomacy to the West. An initial appraisal suggests that Russian public diplomacy is not credible because it presents an image that is too positive so that it appears more like propaganda rather than a realistic policy defense. 51 However, public relations institutions learn over time and are likely to fi nd the political and cultural elements that resonate with Westerners and more effectively present them in the future. Moscow has developed the institutional framework to have a public diplomacy that can consistently reach foreigners and thereby has the capacity to expand Russian soft power.
Russia realized that its soft power was not as strong as that of the United States and Europe, and recognized that it would have to seriously invest in its soft power to try to counter the Western competition. One of the ways that it tried to expand its soft power was to create new study abroad programs for students to study in Russia. The idea is similar to student programs in the United States, where students would come to experience life and culture in Russia and then bring Moscow's soft power back to their home countries.
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Russia began to provide more foreign aid, especially in the form of disaster relief. For example, in 2014, Russia was one of the fi rst countries to send in aid to Serbia following severe fl ooding that left many people homeless and many lives in peril. 53 This type of foreign aid is extremely important in spreading good will and thus spreading Russia's soft power.
The previous examples of spreading soft power are positive examples in that they spread Russian ideas, but do not try directly to compete and destroy other values and ideology. Instead, it tries to build good will and positive feelings toward Russia. Foreign aid or accepting foreign students does not demand that students abandon their own culture and values. Good will is thus achieved through the positive transfer of soft power. However, the competitive nature of Russian soft power with the West also created negative types of soft power by trying to change individual cultures and values of other states. Again the West was much more advanced in changing values and ideals than Russia, so Russia had to fi nd ways to attack and denigrate Western values and ideology.
One area in which Russia felt it was extremely defi cient in soft power compared to the West was its ability to spread information. However, the problem with both social media and the Russian World Foundation concept is that people must go to these locations for it to be effective. In other words, most of the people who seek these services and methods of spreading Russian soft power are those who are not Moscow's target audience as they are already consumers of Russian soft power. Generally, they already speak Russian and are sympathetic to Russian values and ideology. It is not diffi cult to preach to the converted. Yet Russia needed to fi nd a way to sow the seeds of doubt about the moral justness of Western values and ideology if it was to be successful in spreading its soft power.
The Russian government realized how important media outlets were in spreading soft power and delivering messages. They saw that companies like CNN and other news outlets were very effective in broadcasting Western messages and spreading soft power. Therefore they developed a plan to invest in media programs that would help to spread the Kremlin's message. Specifi cally, they said that they wanted to develop media that would present news in such a way as not being totally biased toward the Western point of view.
One of the media outlets that the Russian government developed was the Voice of Russia. It was the Russian government's international radio broadcasting service. It was broadcast in over 38 different languages. In 2013, Vladimir Putin decreed that the Voice of Russia was to be merged with the Sputnik News Agency, and would further be incorporated with RIA Novosty (the main Russian news service) into a new news organization called Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today).
56 Russia Today's main aim was to provide information on Russian policy and life and society for international audiences. 58 For example, whenever the West would criticize the Soviet Union over issues such as human rights, the Soviets would respond with a statement that questioned racial relations in the United States. The comment would never directly address the legitimacy of the criticism, merely defl ect the criticism by pointing out the hypocrisy of the criticism in the fi rst place. The Russian government expanded the Soviet technique and began to expand its usage in media programs on RT and other Russian media sources. For example, when the West criticized Russia for its invasion and subsequent referendum in Crimea, Russia immediately pointed to the West's actions in Kosovo and pointed out the hypocrisy of the West's criticism. It is important to note, however, that such a response does not justify or seek to defend Russia's actions, it merely defl ects the argument by stating that those leveling the criticism are no better and do not possess the moral authority with which to criticize. 59 This is a much easier argument to make than a moral justifi cation, and seeds enough doubt in the moral justifi cation of the West to stop the spread of Western soft power. One of the most noted examples of "Whataboutism" involved Edward Snowden, a United States government contractor who worked for the National Security Agency. Snowden became very upset with secret government surveillance programs designed to protect the United States from terrorism. He believed that the data gathering techniques were unconstitutional and violated citizens' rights to privacy. Snowden leaked information about these surveillance programs to the media, and incurred the ire of the United States. In 2013, Snowden left the United States and sought asylum overseas. He tried to fl ee to Ecuador but the U.S. cancelled his passport while in route during a layover in the Moscow airport and, as a result, Russia granted him temporary asylum. While the West has accused Moscow of violating international due process, Moscow has used the publicity of Snowden to show that the West is hypocritical as its policies do not match its rhetoric when it comes to protecting individual liberty and freedom. Again, Moscow is able to use the United States' own moral shortcomings as a message that works to stop the spread of Western soft power.
The Russian government's efforts to increase spending on the media as a way of spreading its message globally is an extremely important part of the Russian soft power strategy. However, it should be noted that the budget for these media outlets are still much less than Western media outlets, so it remains to be seen how effective this strategy will be to spread Russian soft power.
However, Russia has not only tried to spread its own message through media outlets, but it has also tried to discredit Western soft power and more specifi cally the message being presented by Western media outlets. In late 2014 and early 2015, news surfaced that the Russian had employed internet trolls to discredit Western media messages and to try to provide Russian perspectives on certain issues. 60 The 60 Bertrand, Natasha. Russian Internet Trolls Are Trained to Spread Propaganda in Three-Person Teams // Business Insider, 2015. Mode of access: http://www.businessinsider.com/russianjob of these bloggers was basically to provide a positive view of Russian foreign policy and to discredit Western policy. They used social media as well as the comment section of many different internet news sites. They were so successful that many internet newspapers such as The Moscow Times stopped allowing comments from individual people, as there were just so many different comments that were pointedly anti-Western and pro-Russian.
The new Russian media strategy to help spread Russia's soft power has been effective in many ways. It has certainly gotten the message to many and presented Russian arguments against Western hegemonic actions. In fact, many critics point to Russia's increased active efforts to spread Russian soft power as being nothing more than propaganda. However, the efforts have been effective enough that the United States House of Representatives has even conducted hearings into the danger to national security that this new form of Russian propaganda poses. 61 The House Committee on Foreign Affairs argued that Russian state marketing was really dangerous to the national security of the United States, and that the United States needed to directly confront Russian propaganda in such a way as to effectively counter and remove the threat.
Despite the gains in the strength of Russian soft power, Russia is still not fully trusted within the post-Soviet space. Many of Russia's past imperial actions during the Soviet era are remembered by the former Soviet republics. 62 This is evidence of not only the effectiveness of Russian soft power, but also of a growing rift between political elites who are extremely wary of Russia and its intentions and more common people.
Ultimately, Russia realizes that it is almost impossible to directly counter Western soft power. While Russia is not the Soviet Union, there is still a deep mistrust of Russian intentions toward Eastern Europe. Russian efforts at spreading positive soft power through disaster relief and aid can be somewhat successful in states like Serbia, yet can't be expected to be effective in states like Poland. While Russia believes that it is protecting traditional values by opposing the West, it is no less imperialistic in its soft power aims than the West. It also wants to regain its infl uence in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region. Russia recognizes that it is no longer the Soviet Union and does not want to recreate the Soviet Union, but Russia also believes that its values and identity are superior to those of other states, and wants to see the triumph of Russian traditional values over those of the West. Russian soft power as an opposing force to the spread of Western soft power is still in its infancy, yet is growing in power. It is trying to defeat a more powerful foe in much the same way as guerilla insurrections target stronger forces. It attacks its opponent at weak points, but doesn't stay exposed. Instead, Russian soft power focuses on pointing out hypocrisy of Western values and trying to cast doubt on the belief that Western values will inevitably triumph. The irony of the situation is that Eastern Europe is again in the crosshairs of this soft power competition. Neither Russia nor the West is concerned with traditional Eastern European values and traditions, and inevitably those values will be destroyed by the ideological imperial struggle between the two opposing powers. 
